The fertilizer shock triggered by the war is widening beyond nitrogen and into a part of the agricultural system that could prove even harder to stabilize: phosphates. The initial market panic centered on urea because nitrogen fertilizers are immediately critical for crops such as corn and because Gulf disruptions quickly pushed those prices higher.

But the deeper and potentially more prolonged risk is now emerging through sulfur, a less visible input that is essential to processing phosphate fertilizers used heavily on soybeans, potatoes and many other crops. Because almost half of global sulfur supply comes from Middle Eastern producers exposed to the Strait of Hormuz, the war is threatening not just one fertilizer segment but a much broader slice of the crop-nutrient chain.

Latin America is beginning to respond to the Iran war not as a distant geopolitical event, but as a direct fiscal and social threat. The basic shift across the region is away from trying to fully shield consumers from imported fuel inflation and toward rationing the fiscal damage instead.

Brent has climbed sharply since the conflict began and that prolonged higher energy prices are already raising inflation risks and weakening growth prospects globally, especially for import-dependent emerging markets.

The gasoline market is now showing one of the clearest downstream effects of the Iran war: Asia is pulling barrels from ever farther away because its normal regional supply system is no longer enough. At least three European gasoline cargoes totaling about 1.6 million barrels loaded last week for Asia, while U.S. cargoes have also been booked for Australia.

That is a significant shift because Europe usually sends only limited gasoline volumes east of Suez, preferring nearer markets such as the United States, Latin America and West Africa. When those cargoes start heading to Asia, it is a sign that the regional shortage has become severe enough to redraw trade routes globally.

Europe’s industrial core is being hit by the Iran war in a way that is both immediate and cumulative. Companies across chemicals, plastics, metals, textiles and consumer manufacturing are now dealing with another sharp rise in raw-material and energy costs after already absorbing the pandemic shock, the post-Ukraine energy crisis and U.S. tariffs.

In Germany, the pressure is especially acute because many firms entered this latest disruption with margins already eroded and little room left to absorb another cost wave.

Ghana’s approval of Atlantic Lithium’s Ewoyaa project is important not just because it clears the way for the country’s first lithium mine, but because it shows how African governments are trying to balance investor pressure with a broader push to capture more value from the energy transition.

Parliament ratified a 15-year mining lease under which royalties will now be charged on a sliding scale linked to spodumene prices, ranging from 5% below $1,500 a ton to 12% above $3,200. That replaces the flat 10% rate Ghana had originally sought more than two years ago, when the project first applied for a permit.

China may be close to escaping deflation on paper, but the way it is happening is economically awkward rather than cleanly positive. The Iran war could push China’s producer prices back into positive territory after more than three years of deflation, largely because Brent had risen roughly 45% since late February and higher oil prices feed directly into factory costs. 

The background is that China’s deflation problem has been driven by weak household demand and excess industrial capacity, not by a shortage of supply. Inflation data showed February CPI rose 1.3% year on year, helped by holiday spending, while PPI was still down 0.9%, extending the producer-price deflation streak even as it narrowed.

The first phase of the Trump administration’s emergency oil release shows both the scale and the limits of Washington’s response to the Iran war. The U.S. Energy Department awarded exchanges covering 45.2 million barrels from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, a little over half of the 86 million barrels initially offered in the first tranche of a planned 172 million-barrel U.S. contribution to the wider IEA-led release.

Under the awards, the government expects to receive about 55 million barrels back later, meaning the oil is being lent rather than permanently sold, with repayment premiums of roughly 18% to 22%.

CERAWeek is opening this year under conditions that have transformed it from a forum about long-term strategy into a war-cabinet-style gathering about immediate energy security. The conference returns to Houston with more than 10,000 attendees from over 80 countries just as the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran has pushed oil close to $120 a barrel, disrupted the Strait of Hormuz, and damaged core Gulf energy infrastructure.

The result is that a meeting which might otherwise have focused on AI demand, power growth and corporate transition strategy is now being dominated by the politics of supply disruption, shipping risk and inflation.