Norway is doubling down on the long life of its petroleum sector, even as much of Europe talks about energy transition and fossil-fuel phaseout. The government has opened 70 new exploration blocks in its annual predefined-area licensing round, including 38 in the Barents Sea, 10 in the Norwegian Sea, and 22 in the North Sea, with applications due by September 1 and final awards expected in early 2027.

At the same time, Oslo approved ConocoPhillips and its partners to redevelop the Albuskjell, Vest Ekofisk, and Tommeliten Gamma fields, which still contain an estimated 90 million to 120 million barrels of oil equivalent in gas and condensate. Production from those assets is expected to start in 2028 and continue until 2048, with investment of about 19 billion Norwegian crowns.

The fact that EU energy ministers are set to discuss domestic gas production at all is politically revealing. At next week’s meeting, ministers will consider the role of “indigenous gas resources” in helping stabilize prices after the Iran war exposed Europe’s vulnerability to imported fuel shocks.

The discussion paper, prepared by Cyprus as holder of the rotating EU presidency, explicitly asks whether domestic reserves could act as a collective mechanism for price stability across the Union while avoiding long-term lock-in to carbon-intensive systems.

The G7 is exploring something much more durable than another summit communiqué on critical minerals: a standing institutional mechanism meant to survive the bloc’s yearly rotation of presidencies. G7 countries are discussing a permanent secretariat to oversee critical-minerals work, with possible homes at either the International Energy Agency or the OECD in Paris.

The logic is straightforward. Critical-mineral supply chains take years to build, while G7 political leadership changes every year. A permanent unit would give continuity to stockpiling, coordination, and diversification efforts that otherwise risk stalling as presidencies change.

Europe’s current energy stress looks serious in oil, but far less severe in electricity, and that difference is one of the most important features of the 2026 shock. The continent is unquestionably dealing with an oil and gas disruption linked to the Iran war and the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, yet wholesale power markets have so far remained far calmer than they were during the 2022 crisis triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

French one-year forward power prices were around €50 per megawatt hour, roughly unchanged from prewar levels and vastly below the August 2022 peak above €1,100/MWh, while similar markets in Germany, the UK, Italy, and Spain have also stayed much closer to normal than they did four years ago.

Global markets are still behaving as though the Iran war is serious but manageable, with investors choosing to focus on earnings strength and the AI-led profit cycle rather than fully repricing the geopolitical shock. Stocks rose on Tuesday, with the S&P 500 up 0.6%, the Nasdaq up 0.9%, and Europe’s STOXX 600 up 0.5%, as strong results from companies such as Anheuser-Busch and UniCredit helped offset renewed concern over Gulf hostilities.

At the same time, Brent crude remained extremely elevated at $111.27 a barrel even after pulling back from levels near $115 the day before, when renewed fighting pushed prices sharply higher. The immediate market message is that investors are still splitting the world into two separate stories.

The Trump administration’s threat to impose 100% tariffs on branded medicines is already reshaping the pharmaceutical industry well before full enforcement begins. Washington is moving toward tariffs on patented drugs that are neither produced in the United States nor covered by pricing agreements, while delaying enforcement for companies that commit to U.S. manufacturing or drug-price concessions.

That has triggered a rapid industry response: large drugmakers are accelerating domestic investment plans, building inventory buffers, and in some cases striking pricing deals to secure temporary exemptions. What makes this especially significant is that the policy is not operating like a conventional tariff alone. It is being used as an industrial-policy lever and a pricing-policy lever at the same time.

The Trump administration is now signaling that its threat to raise tariffs on EU car imports from 15% back to 25% is not just negotiating theater. U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer told EU and German officials over the weekend that Washington would move forward with the increase, while also describing the tariff as “one part of the deal,” suggesting the administration still sees it as leverage inside a broader bargaining framework rather than a fully settled end state.

As of Monday afternoon, the higher tariff had not yet been formally adopted. The immediate dispute is about alleged EU non-compliance with last summer’s trade deal, a claim Brussels rejects. Trump said the bloc had failed to uphold the agreement and that EU officials responded by calling the move arbitrary and warning that they would keep options open to defend European interests.

China’s carmakers are moving into a new phase of their global expansion, one that is less about simply shipping low-cost vehicles overseas and more about trying to become genuinely local competitors in foreign markets. Major groups including BYD, Chery, Changan, SAIC’s MG, and FAW’s Hongqi are now developing models specifically for export destinations rather than merely adapting cars originally designed for Chinese buyers.

The comparison many in the industry are making is Toyota’s Yaris, a small car designed in Europe for European consumers that helped the Japanese company build lasting credibility on the continent.