The expected repeal of carbon pollution standards for coal- and gas-fired power plants would mark one of the most important environmental rollbacks of Donald Trump’s second administration. The move is not only about power-plant regulation. It is a broader statement about the administration’s energy strategy, its view of industrial competitiveness and its willingness to dismantle the legal architecture of U.S. climate policy.

The rules targeted by the Environmental Protection Agency were adopted under former President Joe Biden as part of a wider effort to reduce carbon dioxide, mercury and other air pollutants from the electricity sector. The carbon rules alone were expected to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by about 1 billion metric tons by 2047. Repealing them would therefore weaken one of the central pillars of the previous administration’s climate agenda.

Italy’s decision to speed up domestic oil and gas production reflects the return of hard energy-security politics in Europe. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s government is trying to reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels at a time when the U.S.-Iran war has disrupted flows through the Strait of Hormuz, raised energy prices and exposed the vulnerability of import-dependent economies.

The policy is being presented as common sense: if Italy has domestic resources, the government argues, it should not rely entirely on foreign suppliers. The measures adopted by Rome are focused on permitting and administrative delays. The government plans to appoint special commissioners when local authorities fail to decide on drilling-license applications within required deadlines.

China’s August economic data are set to test whether the recent slowdown is bottoming out or whether Beijing will need to move more forcefully to support domestic demand before year-end. The picture is likely to be mixed. Industrial production may improve as weather disruptions fade and export demand remains strong, but investment is expected to weaken further and consumer spending remains deeply subdued. That combination points to stabilization without real momentum.

The central issue is that China’s economy is still being held up by production and exports, not by households. Demand for AI-related goods, including integrated circuits and computers, continues to support factories. Improving weather conditions and the gradual flow of new policy-bank funding may also help activity recover from July’s weak readings. But the consumer side of the economy remains fragile, and property investment continues to contract sharply.

Saudi Arabia’s decision to shut its East-West pipeline after an aerial attack marks a serious escalation in the Middle East energy crisis. For the past six months, the pipeline has been one of the most important escape routes for Gulf crude while the Strait of Hormuz has been largely closed by war.

If that route is no longer secure, the oil market is facing a much more dangerous problem: not just disruption at one chokepoint, but a widening campaign against the alternative infrastructure that kept supplies moving. The East-West pipeline is strategically vital because it allows Saudi crude to cross the Arabian Peninsula from the Gulf side to the Red Sea, bypassing Hormuz. During the current conflict, it has reportedly moved 4 million to 5 million barrels per day, equal to roughly 4% to 5% of global supply.

The White House’s consideration of the Defense Production Act to expand U.S. refining capacity shows how the Iran conflict has turned fuel prices into both an economic vulnerability and a political emergency. The United States remains one of the world’s largest oil producers and refiners, but high diesel and gasoline prices have exposed a critical constraint: energy security is not only about crude supply.

It also depends on the ability to turn crude into usable fuels at sufficient scale, in the right locations, and at affordable cost. The fact that the administration is considering the Defense Production Act is striking. The law is normally treated as an emergency industrial-policy tool, used when national defense or critical supply chains require direct government support.

The U.S. Commerce Department’s final duties on solar imports from India, Indonesia and Laos mark another escalation in Washington’s long-running effort to defend domestic solar manufacturing from low-cost Asian supply chains. The case is not only about three countries. It is part of a wider struggle over whether the United States can build a clean-energy manufacturing base while competing against production networks that originated in China and have repeatedly shifted across Asia to avoid trade barriers.

The duties are steep. Commerce assigned anti-dumping margins of 123.04% for Indian producers, 94.36% for Indonesian producers and 65.43% for producers from Laos. It also set countervailing duties of 126.09% for Indian producers, between 73.2% and 173.7% for Indonesian producers, and between 82.03% and 153.67% for Lao producers.

The European Union’s decision to abandon a proposed export duty on aluminium scrap shows how difficult it is for Brussels to reconcile industrial protection, sustainability goals and trade diplomacy. The levy was intended to keep more scrap inside Europe, support domestic recyclers and smelters, and reduce dependence on energy-intensive primary aluminium.

Instead, the Commission has stepped back from the measure amid concern that it could complicate the final signature of a free trade agreement with India. The reversal is significant because aluminium scrap is no longer a marginal waste product. It is a strategic industrial input. Recycled aluminium requires far less energy than primary aluminium, making it valuable for Europe’s decarbonization agenda and for manufacturers trying to reduce emissions.

QatarEnergy’s talks to secure multi-year U.S. LNG supplies mark a significant shift in the global gas market. Qatar is usually one of the world’s most reliable LNG exporters, especially for Asian buyers. Now it is reportedly negotiating with producers such as Venture Global, Cheniere and Woodside to buy volumes through 2031.

That suggests the disruption caused by Iranian attacks and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is no longer being treated as a short-term interruption. It is becoming a multi-year supply problem. The immediate cause is the damage to QatarEnergy’s Ras Laffan complex. Two LNG trains and a gas-to-liquids facility were hit by Iranian strikes in March, taking 12.8 million tons per year of LNG capacity offline for an estimated three to five years.