Germany’s economy ministry is preparing a sharp pivot in how it treats small-scale solar: a draft bill would end subsidies for new installations up to 25 kilowatts, essentially the rooftop segment, on the grounds that falling equipment costs have made these systems commercially viable without public support, at least when households or small businesses consume a large share of their own output.

The ministry is presenting this as part of a broader “cost efficiency and security of supply” correction in energy policy rather than as a retreat from renewables, and it is aiming to bring new rules to cabinet discussion by the end of March.

Global fund-flow data are starting to show that the “AI trade” is no longer a one-way bet for broad equity allocations. In the week to February 25, net purchases of global equity funds slowed to $19.75 billion, the weakest weekly inflow in five weeks, as investors grew more cautious about the cost, crowding, and potential disruption associated with the hyperscaler-led AI buildout.

The immediate catalyst for the shift in tone was a jolt from the market’s bellwether. Nvidia’s shares dropped about 5.5% after its latest results, even though the company beat expectations, because the report reinforced investor unease that the AI cycle is entering a phase where incremental growth is harder to impress the market and where the capital spending required across the ecosystem is enormous.

Europe’s largest port is effectively issuing a warning that the China risk debate has been framed too narrowly. The controversy in Rotterdam and other European hubs often focuses on who operates or leases container terminals, but the port’s chief executive is arguing the more consequential vulnerability is the content of trade itself: the scale of Europe’s reliance on Chinese-origin goods and components embedded inside inbound cargo.

In his telling, the strategic issue is not primarily ownership of cranes and berths; it is that Europe’s production system has become so dependent on Chinese inputs that a disruption, even a selective one, can ripple across multiple industries.

Europe is approaching an industrial inflection point that rarely makes headlines but quietly determines whether factories stay open: how the continent will produce process heat in a post-cheap-gas world.

Lawmakers and the Commission are preparing new measures this spring that aim to accelerate electrified industrial heat, with heat pumps, electric boilers, and other direct electrification technologies, because the old default of gas-fired boilers has become both costly and strategically fraught since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Policymakers see the current patchwork of half-steps as untenable as job losses mount and energy-intensive sectors struggle for a viable operating model.

The European Commission’s decision to provisionally apply the EU–Mercosur free trade agreement is a hard-edged political choice dressed in the language of commercial urgency. Rather than waiting for the standard sequence of ratification by the European Parliament and national processes, Brussels is moving to activate the deal’s core trade provisions once the EU and Mercosur exchange formal notifications, with provisional entry possible two months later.

The Commission is explicitly justifying the move as a bid for “first-mover advantage,” a telling phrase that frames trade policy as strategic positioning in a more contested global economy rather than as a slow, consensus-driven regulatory exercise.

China’s rare-earth export controls have matured from a headline policy into a daily operational problem for thousands of exporters, and the most telling symptom is how basic the questions have become.

Nearly a year after Beijing broadened controls that it said were meant to stop rare earths from ending up in foreign militaries, companies are still asking where the line is between normal trade and controlled dual-use exports, down to whether a small magnet inside a consumer product turns the whole item into a licensable shipment.

This survey is essentially saying that the oil market is being pulled by two opposing forces at the same time, and forecasters are now pricing both more explicitly. Near-term, the U.S.-Iran confrontation and broader geopolitical friction are inflating prices through a visible risk premium. Medium-term, most analysts still think the market is heading into surplus, so they expect that premium to fade and fundamentals to reassert downward pressure.

The consensus 2026 Brent forecast was nudged up to about $63.85 per barrel from $62.02 in January, while WTI was raised to about $60.38 from $58.72. Yet both benchmarks have averaged notably higher so far this year, which itself is consistent with the idea that today’s price is being held up by risk rather than by a tight physical balance.

A genuine AI-led productivity acceleration could make today’s debt trajectories look less explosive by raising the denominator of debt-to-GDP and, potentially, lifting tax receipts. But it is not a substitute for fiscal repair, because the biggest drivers of future deficits in advanced economies are structural, like ageing-related entitlements, higher interest bills after the post-pandemic rate reset, and mounting political pressure to spend more on defence and climate adaptation.

Many economists frame AI as “time-buying” rather than “problem-solving,” precisely because debt ratios are already above 100% of output across most rich economies and are expected to climb further even before assuming any macro shock.